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The German Socio-Economic Panel: How It All Began 
  
By Hans-Jürgen Krupp 
  
 
The Socio-Economic Panel—usually referred to today as SOEP
1—has become an integral part 
of the global scientifically-based research infrastructure in the social, economic, and behavior
sciences. The data set is used widely today, both in Germany and internationally, and has long 
since transcended narrow disciplinary boundaries. Now, with 25 waves (in 2008), the SOEP 
household panel encompasses a vast amount of data covering a quarter of a century. 
 
But SOEP is more than just an example of successful science and research policy in practice, a 
project that has involved numerous universities, an economic research institute, a commercial 
survey institute, the German Research Foundation (DFG), several federal ministries, a number of 
state-level science and technology ministries, and a federal-state program providing joint funding 
for research. It is, at the same time, the achievement of the many researchers who have shaped, 
supported, and participated in this project over the years. 
 
Against the background of SOEP’s now universally recognized success, it may be of interest to 
look back on the last 30 years and examine the origins of this longitudinal study. My focus in the 
following will therefore be on the period up to the project’s approval, and thus, on the process of 
SOEP’s birth. This history of the Socio-Economic Panel starts with very personal experiences, 
judgments, and misjudgments. Reporting on these is crucial, however, to provide a better 
understanding of the motives that ultimately led to SOEP. 
 
1 For many years, the only term used in the German Research Foundation’s Collaborative Research Center (Sfb 3) 
and at DIW in  Berlin was “the panel,” since at that time, no other comparable panel study existed in Germany—of 
individuals, households, or firms. Taking solely its “generic name” into consideration, the term that applies best to 
SOEP is not “panel” but the one in common parlance today, “household panel,” although it is imprecise since SOEP 
can be used also as a panel study of individuals both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. So “SOEP” makes a lot of 
sense. The way in which “socio-economic” is written in German has changed as well from “Sozio-ökonomisch” to 
“Sozio-oekonomisch”, thereby rendering the German Umlaut “ö” as “oe” and making the acronym “SOEP” 
understandable in both German and English. The acronym SOEP is used throughout this paper, although it was not 
used at the beginning of the study.    2
Ideas  
 
First, it must be said that in the 1960s and 70s, the new possibilities for data processing were 
overestimated, while the importance of longitudinal data was underestimated. This can be seen in 
my own “second book” (Habilitation thesis), entitled “The Theory of Personal Income 
Distribution” (Krupp, 1968). Along with a theoretical part, it contained a section on 
“distributional policy simulations,” which were carried out at a medium level of aggregation and 
based on empirical data. The necessity of  panel data was demonstrated in both the theoretical 
and the empirical part, although the term itself was not used explicitly.  
 
The theoretical part of the thesis distinguished between permanent and transitory income 
elements. These terms were linked to the discussion of Keynes’ consumption function and to 
Milton Friedman in particular. If one had interpreted the transitory elements as individual income 
fluctuations over time, one would have needed panel data to estimate them. I avoided this by 
employing an artful device. “Transitory” can mean both the different individuals in a cross-
section as well as the same individuals over time. Both of these possibilities are discussed in the 
book, and the conclusion ultimately reached is that the sum of all transitory income elements in a 
period equals zero. This allows one to put the longitudinal data problem aside. As a logical 
consequence, the simulation part of the paper offers no inter-temporal interpretation of this 
theoretically interesting element. And as a result, the concluding recommendations for future 
research stress the need for more differentiated cross-sectional income data, but not for panel 
data.  
 
To provide an empirical validation of simulation results, one has to know the situation at the 
beginning of the first period as well as at the end of the first period or in other words, the 
beginning of the second. Thus, one needs data sets for different points in time. The question of 
whether this would entail a sequence of cross-sections or of longitudinal sections is not dealt 
with in my Habilitation thesis, however. There were no doubt a number of good reasons for this. 
The economic thinking of the 1960s was largely macroeconomic in orientation. At that time, 
almost no one considered the possibility of conducting microanalyses, although the group around 
Guy Orcutt had already drafted the first concepts for microeconomic simulation models at the 
end of the 1950s—first in Madison, Wisconsin, and later in Washington, D.C. (Orcutt et al., 
1957). I had even encountered these concepts myself as a post-doc at Madison in 1962. With the   3
                                                          
Survey of Consumer Finances, I had also come into contact with a university-based survey, that 
is, a major survey conducted outside of official statistics.  
 
In the 1960s, the disaggregation of macroaggregates into “group models” seemed like the most 
promising path. This choice was no doubt a sensible one given the limited computer capacities of 
that time. And with group models, the difference between real longitudinal or panel data and a 
sequence of cross-sections does not play a significant role.  
 
In the year 1975, a study commissioned by the German “Commission for Economic and Social 
Change” appeared under the title, “Opportunities for improving the income and wealth statistics” 
(Krupp, 1975). It reveals the same ambivalence described above between theoretical insights into 
longitudinal design on the one hand and practical neglect of this idea on the other. In this study 
one aspect of  distribution analysis is  to look at the stability of the income flow, which can only 
be measured longitudinally. In the section of the study on this topic (p. 25f), a convincing 
argument for the collection of longitudinal data is presented. Yet the conclusions sound 
exceedingly timid: “As interesting as the idea may be, pursuing it still remains unrealistic. It is 
unlikely that the resources for such a large-scale statistical endeavor will become available in the 
foreseeable future. Furthermore, one must ask whether the potential increase in information 
generated justifies the  large statistical effort required.” 
 
The study made a number of concrete recommendations for improving the income statistics, and 
also demonstrated their feasibility. However, these suggestions were only realized to a limited 
extent. This was no doubt among the reasons why future efforts focused on creating a data 
provision system based in the research community. Given their relevance, the findings and 
suggestions contained in this study were incorporated into the plans for the later SOEP: in 
particular, the recommendation to include foreigners and people living in institutions. For the 
statistical system in Germany at that time, this was an unprecedented novelty. 
 
Just a few years later, in 1978, the chance arose to significantly improve the data situation by 
applying for funds from the German Research Foundation (DFG) to create a new Collaborative 
Research Center, the later Center “Microanalytical Foundations of Social Policy”.
2 By then, 
 
2 Its acronym was “Sfb 3,” which is written out in German as Sonderforschungsbereich 3 and referred to in English 
as Collaborative Research Center 3.   4
                                                          
privacy issues and the  data protection debate had limited the access to official data, and 
particularly microdata, so severely that it began to appear more practical for social and economic 
scientists to collect the data themselves, just as natural scientists had been doing for 200 years. 
 
One of the main objectives of the new Collaborative Research Center (Sfb 3) was to develop  
micro-simulation models. Preliminary work in this area (cf. Krupp, 1978 a, b) had demonstrated 
that cross-sectional data did not take one far in developing and testing hypotheses or estimating 
the parameters of dynamic microsimulation models. Consequently, the research application 
proposed that the panel would “enable the collection of longitudinal data, which are 
indispensable for testing causal hypotheses.” This idea infuses large segments of the research 
application.  
 
Interestingly, one major substantive justification was not mentioned in the research application. 
It related to the descriptive use of longitudinal panel data: namely, the fact that important 
changes over time often do not show up in cross-sectional data at all. Thus the duration of 
unemployment is a different matter entirely than the level thereof. A similar argument holds for 
poverty. Only with longitudinal data is it possible to determine whether a society is dealing with 
an entrenched poor population or with individuals who appear as poor only for short phases.  
 
In the first research application for Sfb 3 from the year 1978, which was completed in large part 
in 1977, for the research years 1979, 1980, and 1981, a panel study was portrayed as a potential 
future outcome of the Collaborative Research Center, and the funds requested were to be used 
only for the panel’s preparation. This meant that according to the original plans, the actual “panel 
project” was to begin at least three years later. There were a number of reasons for this. First of 
all, the panel’s advocates had to accept that a project of this magnitude would require thorough 
preparation, although not more than three years. Second, over the course of the SPES projects,
 3 
the forerunner of Sfb 3, urgent data needs had arisen that could and would now be met through 
special cross-sectional surveys without any panel character. And finally, given the dimensions of 
the Collaborative Research Center, the applicants did not want to impose exaggerated funding 
 
3 The Collaborative Research Center 3 built on the experiences of the socio-political research group founded in 1971 
at the University of Frankfurt, and later expanded to the University of Mannheim, with the programmatic title 
“Socio-political decision and indicator system for the Federal Republic of Germany” (SPES). The SPES project was 
itself set up as an interdisciplinary one, which was true even more for the Collaborative Research Center 3. The 
increased multidisciplinarity broadened the spectrum of the problems to be dealt with and made a differentiation of 
models inevitable.    5
                                                          
requests on the German Research Foundation’s Reviewer Committee. While this might seem 
overly timid to us today, especially against the backdrop of SOEP’s later success, the 9.7 million 
DM (about 5 million Euros) requested for three years was already a lofty sum.
4  
 
The application for Collaborative Research Center 3 was evaluated on May 17 and 18, 1978. 
Since the plan foresaw the creation of several surveys, data problems played a prominent role in 
the peer review discussions. Interestingly, they revolved primarily around the question of 
whether the real reason for creating an independent survey was the Federal Statistical Office’s 
highly inflexible position of categorical refusal to release microdata. The application pointed 
out—rightly, as it turned out—that this problem could be solved in the long term. However, at 
the same time, it was emphasized that the survey had its own objective justification and would in 
no way be rendered superfluous by improved access to official data. Thus the “panel project” 
was mentioned, but longitudinal data did not play a role in the discussion. Nevertheless, one of 
the evaluators—a statistician—posed the right question: he asked whether it might not be better 
to use a panel study for the micro-simulation models. The applicants responded that their plans 




In January 1979, the work of Collaborative Research Center 3 began, and with it the preparations 
for the household panel. This phase was used to the fullest in every respect, as the research report 
which was written in 1981 on the first three years clearly attests. Interestingly, this report dealt in 
detail with the arguments that had been raised against a panel up to that stage.  
 
Apparently, there had been a number of arguments questioning whether a panel study was 
necessary, or whether at least cheaper procedures than a panel approach were possible. It had 
been proposed that individual cross-sections or at least sequence of cross-sections be used to 
derive quasi-panel data by reinterpreting the individual observations—for example, by compiling 
observations on different individuals of different ages into an overall observation of one 
 
4 If one had wanted to realize SOEP at all costs, it would have been necessary to give up the cross-sectional surveys. 
One argument against this was that using a panel to meet these data needs would have resulted in delays that could 
not be  accepted by the Collaborative Research Center, given the team-oriented organizational structure of such 
centers. It may also have played a role that in 1977, I was responsible for the panel section of the research 
application and at the same time I was President of the Frankfurt University during a very difficult period. Thus, the 
time available for my research work was  limited.   6
individual fictive person. The question of whether longitudinal data could be restricted from the 
outset to a retrospective survey also played a major role in the discussion. Fortunately, to answer 
these questions, it was possible to draw on experiences gleaned in other areas within the 
Collaborative Research Center. They clearly revealed the limitations of retrospective questions 
for the investigation of key research issues—for example, poverty questions, where data on 
household income is indispensable.  
 
By this time, the conditions determining the personnel situation had changed. In April 1979, I 
became President of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW, today called DIW 
Berlin ), which allowed me more time for research than my post as President of Frankfurt 
University and thus also for my responsibilities as project director of the “panel project”. It was 
especially important that in January 1981, the young economist Ute Hanefeld joined the panel 
project group, just in time for the Collaborative Research Center’s application process. She was 
working as a doctoral student, a position then in Germany called “junior researcher” , and she 
became a driving force in the project, providing crucial support to the project director as well. 
She traveled to the United States, studied the different panel projects underway there, 
coordinated the evaluation of the various surveys carried out within the Collaborative Research 
Center for the purposes of SOEP’s planning, and established contact with the fieldwork 
organizations that came into consideration.  
 
The high scientific standards that she became acquainted with in the US paid off both for her and 
also for what became the SOEP, where she set about to implement these same standards with 
uncompromising zeal. As a result, she succeeded in overcoming various forms of resistance to a 
random sample as opposed to a quota sample. The idea arose to postpone the first main wave of 
the later SOEP to the year 1984, in contrast to the original plans, and to start first with two pilot 
waves. And in fact, the first main wave did ultimately take place in 1984, but for different 
reasons.  
 
The Cooperative Research Center’s application for the second phase of research, 1982 to 1984, 
was submitted to the DFG in June 1981. It contained the first comprehensive description of 
SOEP’s objectives, and explained SOEP’s importance, both for analyzing processes of social   7
                                                          
change and as a data basis for conducting microsimulations, spawning hypotheses for future 
research, and testing their causal interpretation
5.  
 
The basic conception and argumentation for SOEP elucidated in this research application was the 
same one that was later realized in the first main sample. The intense consultation process that I 
will describe in the following shaped how the SOEP study was designed and structured.  
 
Given the complexities involved in setting up a household panel, the difficulties that emerged in 
the evaluation and approval process came as no surprise. Ultimately, with funding needs of 
around two million DM per year (about 1 million euros), SOEP was dealing with sums that were 
and still are far from common in the social and behavioral sciences, although they probably 
would have been seen as more usual in disciplines such as engineering, the natural sciences, or 
medicine. At the beginning of the 80s, many reviewers and evaluators asked themselves what 
might be possible with that much money in other important projects.
6  
 
The evaluation of the application for the second research phase of the Collaborative Research 
Center 3 took place on September 24 and 25, 1981. The Center Sfb 3 had already put the 
performance of its simulation models to the test in the book “Alternatives to Pension Reform 
`84” (Krupp et al., 1981, Galler and Wagner, 1986). It was therefore unsurprising that the 
evaluation was very favorable for the second research phase of the Center. The same was 
essentially true for the proposed panel study as well, but the long-term nature of the project 
demanded special attention. At its meeting of November 25 and 26, 1981, the Reviewer 
Committee of the German Research Foundation (DFG) therefore concluded that a decision could 
not be reached. “We fundamentally acknowledge and applaud this initiative by the Collaborative 
Research Center; the conceptual preparations thus far (…) have been carried out with great 
care.” But before the committee could make a final decision, several questions remained to be 
answered. Some members wanted to know about the planned use of panel data by the different 
Sfb projects within the Collaborative Research Center. Others questioned the sustainability of the 
proposed organizational structure given its connection to DIW in Berlin. In the area of expenses, 
 
5 In those days, such reports were written in German. And up to now, translating it into English has not been 
worthwhile. For the first description of SOEP in English, see Hanefeld (1984). For a retrospective description, see 
Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007). 
6 Many of these problems may be best classified as eccentricities, such as one evaluator’s sincere proposal that 
American panel study experts only be invited if able to speak German. Such experts simply did not exist. The 
translation problems were solved nonetheless.   8
                                                          
they asked that potential means of saving money be discussed. Finally, there was a request to 
consider methodological alternatives. As a result, the committee recommended that the 
application be revised based on the results of a colloquium held with evaluators and experts.
7 
 
According to the German Research Foundation (DFG), the connection to the DIW is “no doubt a 
good opportunity that can be seen as an adequate short-term solution.” This argumentation seems 
somewhat perplexing to us today—as it did then as well—since the connection to the DIW was 
designed precisely to achieve the desired long-term institutional stability. And over the years, 
this setup has proven its worth. It should not be forgotten that in 1981, the DIW had already 
expressed its commitment to prolong SOEP for another ten years if the DFG terminated its 
support at a prior stage. Of course, SOEP’s position within the DIW was not, and never has been, 
easy. In the beginning, this was because of the institute’s clear macroeconomic orientation at a 
time when SOEP was pushing to expand these horizons into the field of microeconomics. Later, 
it was more SOEP’s achievements that stirred envy within the DIW. But DIW supported SOEP 
all the time.  
 
The colloquium called for by the evaluators took place on February 1, 1982. It had the character 
not of a meeting of evaluators but of a discussion with advisors. Central themes of the planned 
panel study were discussed again at length: the question of a quota vs. a random sample, the 
inclusion of foreigners and people living in institutions, as well as the usefulness of pilot studies 
and pretests. By this time, the fieldwork organization “Infratest Sozialforschung”—on its own 
initiative—had also proposed to conduct a third pilot study.  
 
In August 1982, the revised research application was submitted to DFG. It was more in-depth 
than the first version and also significantly longer. While 65 pages had sufficed for the 
preliminary version of the year before, the final application now contained 177 pages, not 
including the tender or the survey institutes’ bids. The application now also offered a very 
consistent justification for the necessity of a household panel and an overview of existing panel 
 
7 One of the remaining problems, although not discussed in the statement of the Grants Committee, was the choice 
of a fieldwork organization. The invitation to tender had been issued to nine firms. Four of these (IFAK, GfK, 
Infratest Sozialforschung, and Marplan) had submitted a bid. These differed widely in quality and made clear that 
creating a panel meant treading new ground for German fieldwork organizations. The Infratest team probably 
understood the long-term commitments and risks this entailed best. Their calculations were exceptionally thorough 
and detailed, but also added up to the highest total price. Taking into account the amount and quality of the work 
specified in the Infratest bid, theirs still came out to be the most economical.   9
                                                          
studies on the national and international levels. The results were clear. Comparable studies 
existed only in the USA. These were discussed in all their strengths and weaknesses to draw 
conclusions for what would later become the SOEP study. 
 
Of crucial importance was the detailed conceptualization of the panel included in the application, 
specifying the overall sample size, survey population and survey instruments, tracking of survey 
respondents over time, and panel maintenance. Emergency measures were even introduced for 
dealing with the danger of high panel mortality.
8  
 
DIW attempted to make the Reviewer Committee’s decision easier by promising to provide 
additional funds for basic infrastructure. However, this meant that the Federal Economics 
Minister and the Senator for Science and Culture of the State of Berlin first had to give their 
agreement. The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs showed very little understanding, stating 
that “it is doubtful whether this project would provide such substantially new findings as to 
justify the high total financial expense.” He proposed that the more reliable official microcensus 
be utilized instead, predicting that the panel “would encounter major difficulties in practical 
implementation—in both collecting and processing the data—that would not fail to have an 
impact on the reliability and validity of the data.” What a severe misprognostication this proved 
to be is seen in the fact that the German Federal Statistical Office itself later made use of the 
SOEP data for the German contribution to the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).
9 
Fortunately, the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology was equipped with better 
forecasting capabilities, and offered significant financial support to SOEP through its special 
grants program for empirical social research. 
 
 
8 In line with the stipulations of the German Research Foundation (DFG), alternatives and their cost effects were 
discussed. The new application was based on a revised bid from Infratest Sozialforschung submitted in response to 
the revised call for tenders of April 6, 1982. GfK and Marplan submitted competing bids. Although the final 
decision in favor of Infratest did not take place at this stage, its bid was already favored because “Infratest made a 
more realistic estimate of the costs entailed than the other institutes based its detailed analysis of the problems.” 
Furthermore, Infratest had also expressed its willingness to cover the VAT costs for the first two waves, amounting 
to DM 350,000 on the total of DM 3,193,000, considering these “investment costs”. 
9 The ECHP ran from 1994 to 2001 and has now been replaced by the EU SILC study. After the Federal Statistical 
Office collected panel data itself on a test basis for three waves (1994 to 1996), SOEP data were entered into the 
ECHP data bank from 1997 on (and thus also retrospectively back to 1994).   10
The Decision 
 
The DFG’s Reviewer Committee meeting took place on October 26 and 27 in the form of a large 
colloquium attended by experts and representatives from different federal ministries, along with 
the committee members themselves. Exceptionally useful lectures were presented by Greg 
Duncan and Charles A. Lininger, who shared American experiences from the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 
 
A difficult discussion unfolded between the DFG and representatives of different ministries. The 
German Research Foundation assumed that the household panel results would be useful for 
policy design and that cofinancing by the beneficiary ministries would therefore make sense. 
Underlying this was the general question of whether or not this kind of data base should be 
considered the responsibility of basic research. The discussion was guided by two considerations. 
On the one hand, the ministries had stated their refusal to provide advance financing for later 
results. On the other, the research community had raised the compelling argument that mixed 
financing could endanger the scientific independence of the panel and should thus be avoided, 
especially at the outset. Both considerations led to the same outcome: the project received purely 
research-based financing. The Federal Ministry of Research and Technology transferred funds to 
the German Research Foundation from its special grants program for empirical social research. 
This co-funding had been stipulated by the German Research Foundation in the grant approval 
notice as a condition for its own support. However, no concrete sum had been mentioned in that 
document, just a “portion of the required funds”.  
 
The scientific discussion with the evaluators clearly revealed the learning process that all those 
involved had gone through. Furthermore, everyone was now well aware of the particularities of 
longitudinal data. The discussion was infused by the common desire to make a household panel 
possible, accompanied by the shared concern that financial difficulties could still endanger the 
entire undertaking. A variety of different options and possibilities for saving money were 
therefore taken carefully into consideration.   
 
The project was approved on December 6, 1982, based on the DFG’s Commissioning Committee 
Meeting of November 24-25, 1982. The German Research Foundation’s stipulations and   11
                                                          
recommendations reflect the high level of discussion that took place among the evaluators and 
have provided an exceptionally useful contribution to SOEP’s development. They included:  
-  establishment of a scientific advisory board
10  
-  good documentation 
-  clear data protection regulations for sharing data with other researchers 
-  oversampling of the foreign population 
-  resolution of methodological problems, as well as retrospective data-checking,  
-  research to maintain the representativeness of the survey 
-  close cooperation with the survey institute. 
 
The approval also included a temporal perspective. The decision was based on “the intention to 
first enable five survey waves to be conducted.” This did not exclude the possibility that, “if 
necessary, a wave could be left out after the first survey waves.” In view of the fact that today 
there exist about 25 waves without gaps, the intention to carry out just five may seem too 
modest. At that time, however, five waves alone were undoubtedly counted as an enormous 
success. The Collaborative Research Center and its representatives had always been reserved in 
discussing the minimum necessary duration of SOEP. It was clear, on the one hand, that this kind 
of panel would increase exponentially in value the longer it continued, but on the other, that a 
funding institution like the German Research Foundation could not be expected to take 
responsibility for the long-term funding of an infrastructure project. As a result, those involved 
always answered such questions with a duration of five years, although it was absolutely clear 
that this was in fact too short. It was thus all the more gratifying that the German Research 




The approval for the panel project was by no means a foregone conclusion. In 1982, the Federal 
Republic of Germany had fallen into difficult budgetary straits that also left their mark on the 
funding available for research programs. The German Research Foundation’s efforts to support a 
 
 
10 From today’s perspective, when SOEP is an asset to social scientists all over the world, it is hard to understand 
why the DFG recommended appointing an advisory board oriented toward the interests of the Collaborative 
Research Center (Sfb 3) and not of potential panel data users.   12
project of this kind reflect a far-sighted perspective that was undoubtedly not easy to convey—
even within the organization itself.  
 
The approval for SOEP’s start was also the result of the dedicated efforts of numerous 
individuals. History is, after all, the result of people’s actions. Not all those who worked to see 
SOEP realized can be mentioned by name here: at the colloquium and evaluation meeting of 
October 1982 alone there were 78 people in attendance according to the list of participants. Yet 
this report would remain incomplete if I failed to mention at least a few of the key individuals 
active during the decisive year of 1982. 
  
Of central importance for the emergence of SOEP was the German Research Foundation. 
Worthy of particular mention are the Head of the Collaborative Research Centers Division, Dr. 
Dieter Funk, and the Head of the Social Sciences Division, Helga Hoppe, as a Sociologist, who 
provided enthusiastic assistance with the difficult procedures involved in the application 
submission, evaluation, and approval process. It should be mentioned that the General Secretary 
of the German Research Foundation, Dr. Carl Heinz Schiel, and Elke Tielinski-Kampick, as a 
member of staff, took part in the meeting of October 1982 as well. The German Research 
Foundation statutory bodies were represented by Professors Werner Meißner, E. Otten, and 
Bernhard Schäfers. German Research Foundation Executive Committee member Professor Franz 
E. Weinert, a renowned psychologist, took part in the advisory meeting of February 1982.  
 
The German Research Foundation’s final decision ultimately rested on the recommendations of 
its evaluators. They had expended considerable effort on a project that was outside their 
immediate disciplines but whose importance for scientific progress, in terms of both content and 
methodology, they recognized. The evaluators who participated in the September 1981 
evaluation, the February 1982 advisory meeting, and the October 1982 evaluation were Dr. Peter 
Hoschka and Professors Karl M. Bolte, Hartmut Esser, Joachim Frohn, Bernhard Gahlen, Klaus-
Dirk Henke, Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, Hermann Korte, Burkhart Lutz, Werner Mangold, Dieter 
Mertens, Friedhelm Neidhardt, Bert Rürup, Bernhard Schäfers, Hans Schneeweiß, Burkhart 
Strümpel, Hans Peter Widmaier, and Rolf Ziegler. 
 
The eleven representatives of federal and state ministries who took time for the evaluators 
colloquium in October 1982 should also not go unmentioned. They included Gertrud Brauer, a   13
                                                          
Government Director in the Ministry for Cultural Affairs of the State of Hesse responsible for 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main, and Hans W. Groscurth, a Senior 
Government Councilor to the Senator for Science and Cultural Affairs responsible for the DIW. 
The Federal Ministry for Research and Technology was represented by Undersecretary Dr. 
Leitersdorf. The Federal Statistical Office also showed great interest, as seen in the participation 
of four staff members (Senior Government Directors Martin Nourney and Dr. Werner Nowak, as 
well as Government Directors Manfred Euler and Horst Steiger). 
 
Finally, all the members of the Cooperative Research Center should be mentioned: together, they 
invested a vast amount of work, effort, and creativity in an innovative and visionary project, but 
one that was by no means risk-free. The Speakers of the Cooperative Research Center during 
these years were Wolfgang Zapf, Richard Hauser, and Reinhard Hujer. Managing Directors were 
Eike Ballerstedt and Klaus Kortmann. The names of those on the “Project’s Council”, which was 
comprised mainly of the heads of projects, offer a good overview of the structure of the 
Cooperative Research Center. When the second research application was submitted, it consisted 
of the following senior scholars: Wolfgang Zapf (Speaker), Reinhard Hujer and Richard Hauser 
(Deputy Speakers), Karl Ulrich Mayer, Hans-Jürgen Krupp, Gerriet Müller, Heinz P. Galler, 
Christof Helberger, Heinz Grohmann, Ralph Brennecke and Klaus Kortmann, and Wolfgang 
Glatzer, Dr. Joachim Merz, Gernold Frank, as well as Maria Volkert, Gerhard Bauer and 
Bernhard Engel (Staff Representatives)
11. 
 
In 1984, the first wave of SOEP—which was being referred to as “the panel”—went into the 
field. The survey had been in concrete planning since 1981. For that purpose the Cooperative 
Research Center Sfb 3 had set up a panel committee where all the details of the survey and 
questionnaire were discussed and determined in an interdisciplinary context. The ultimate form 
of SOEP that emerged from this process is evidence that in science as elsewhere, teamwork can 
bear extremely fruitful results.  
 
At a later stage, crucial expertise was contributed by the SOEP’s Scientific Advisory Committee, 
as well, whose first chairmen were Bernhard Schäfers and Hartmut Esser. In retrospect, one can 
 
 
11 Gert G. Wagner, who became Director of SOEP in 1989, was in 1982 a doctoral student (advised by H.P. Gallen 
and C. Helberger) and became Managing Director of Sfb3 in May 1983. Jürgen Schupp, who became Deputy 
Director in 2004, was a student helper.   14
                                                          
say that a successful balance was achieved in the SOEP’s content between the necessary 
continuity from year to year and the necessary change over the course of time. 
 
“Progress” in Science 
 
It can be seen as a historical irony that the central motive for submitting the application for the 
panel diminished in importance over time, although without SOEP having become in any way 
less useful as a result. In fact, precisely the contrary was the case.  
 
The SPES project and the Cooperative Research Center Sfb 3 intended to create a complex 
micro-macro simulation model.
12 The micro part of this model required, on the one hand, a 
cross-sectional microdata base, and on the other, data that could be used to generate behavioral 
hypotheses. The objective was to overcome the weaknesses of large macroeconometric 
simulation models by allowing for more differentiated conclusions and for empirical validation 
through the inclusion of micro-modules. Thus, these projects intended to tackle the micro 
foundations of macroeconomics in very concrete terms.  
 
By taking on “the micro foundations of macroeconomics”, the later SOEP project was squarely 
in the mainstream of the contemporary scientific development of its time. And German 
economics moved to the worldwide forefront of this development with the state-of-the-art data 
provided by SOEP. As a result, microeconometrics experienced a boom, which in turn benefited 
SOEP and further increased its acceptance.  
 
At this point, it no longer mattered for SOEP that the project of many economists worldwide to 
establish the micro foundations of macroeconomics was increasingly misunderstood as replacing 
macroeconomics with microeconomics. Over the course of this development, large 
macrosimulation models had lost their scientific allure and it was no longer possible to make a 
research career based on a macro model. Thus, by the time the first waves of SOEP were 
released, the large interdependent micro-macro model that had originally been discussed was 
entering its terminal phase of life. And unfortunately, after the Collaborative Research Center 
“Microanalytical Foundations of Social Policy” (Sfb 3) came to an end, these efforts were 
 
12 One can derive an impression of the ideas prevalent at that time in Krupp (1978a,b) and later in Galler und 
Wagner (1986).   15
                                                          




In Germany at the beginning of the 21
st century, we have lost sight, both academically and 
politically, of the broader macroeconomic relationships governing the economy as a whole. 
There are very few indications that this is doing German society good. In fact, it may well be that 
the macroeconomic situation will only come to mind again when it takes a turn for the worse, 
producing even more dire economic and societal conditions than those prevalent today. When 
and if this occurs, SOEP and its now very long and differentiated data records will also be able to 





13 Static in the sense that there is no dynamic modeling of the population dynamics and certainly no connection to 
macroeconomic developments. Of course, by means of household panel data more detailed individual behavioral 
reactions (“behavioral response”) can be modeled on changes in the institutional framework.   16
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